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Following the ﬁnancial crisis and a series of mis-selling and ‘rigging’ scandals
in the ﬁnancial services, organisational culture, and particularly the risk culture
of organisations, has come to be regarded as a key issue for both ﬁnancial ﬁrms
and their regulators This paper considers the extent to which regulatory pub-
lished notices, ‘Final Notices’ (FNs), relating to breaches of the regulatory Hand-
book, are able to provide lessons, or pointers, in the development of
‘appropriate’ cultures. By undertaking a qualitative content analysis of all the
FNs in 2012, we examine the extent to which FNs draw attention to issues of
culture, and to the regulator’s analysis of the drivers of culture published as part
of its treating customers fairly (TCF) initiative. The analysis ﬁnds that, although
not easy to extract, there are important learning points in FNs relating to organi-
sational culture, and in particular to the factors driving behaviours and outcomes
that are signs of poor culture. This paper suggests that, whilst it may not be for a
regulator to dictate ﬁrms’ culture, it could do much more to make use of the con-
tent of FNs as a learning tool for ﬁrms; particularly in the context of its cultural
framework for TCF. This would support the ‘outcomes-based’ approach being
espoused by the UK’s regulators.
Keywords: risk culture; Final Notice; treating customers fairly; content analysis;
Financial Conduct Authority
The crisis exposed signiﬁcant shortcomings in the governance and risk management of
ﬁrms and the culture and ethics which underpin them. (Sants 2012a)
Introduction
Organisational culture in ﬁnancial services ﬁrms has become an important issue for
the UK’s regulator (Sants 2010a; 2010b, Wheatley 2012a) as well as the ﬁrms them-
selves (Salz 2013). In the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis, signiﬁcant academic attention
has also been paid to risk culture within ﬁnancial organisations (Ashby, Palermo,
and Power 2012; FSA 2012a; McConnell 2014). Given the behaviour of ‘rogue’
individuals, the inadequacies of large organisations such as RBS and HSBC, and the
failings of an industry as a whole as evidenced by scandals such as PPI and LIBOR
(Bryce, Cheevers, and Webb 2013), it is increasingly argued that, for ﬁnancial ﬁrms,
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an appropriate risk culture is a key element of an appropriate ﬁrm culture; that is,
the acceptability of ‘“doing what we do” in the ordinary course of business’ (IIF
2009, AIII2).
Ashby , Palermo, and Power draw attention to an increasing expansion, since the
ﬁnancial crisis, in the use of the term ‘risk culture’ in the news, and by professional
bodies and consultancy ﬁrms (2012, 19). For example, in KPMG’s 2008 global sur-
vey on risk management in banks, which covered over 400 professionals involved
in risk management in 79 countries, it was found that 77% of participants were dedi-
cated to establishing a more effective risk culture, with 48% citing risk culture as
the element of risk management most at fault in contributing to the crisis (KPMG
2009). Again, a global ﬁnancial services survey by Deloitte (2011) indicated that
29% of respondents had ‘materially reformed our risk culture to improve the effec-
tiveness of risk oversight’.
An area of regulatory development in the UK where culture has been speciﬁcally
identiﬁed as a key issue is the Financial Conduct Authority’s (FCA’s) (formerly the
Financial Services Authority’s (FSA’s)) Treating Customers Fairly (TCF) initiative
(FSA 2001, 2004, 2006). More particularly, the key drivers and high-level indicators
and contra-indicators of appropriate culture were speciﬁcally identiﬁed by the regu-
lator and set out in its ‘Treating Customers Fairly – Culture’ document (FSA
2007a), establishing a ‘TCF Cultural Framework’ to assist ﬁrms in achieving accept-
able treatment of customers in the sale of ﬁnancial services products. The FSA con-
sistently stressed the importance of ‘embedding TCF into strategy and culture … [of
ﬁrms]’, noting that ‘TCF work focuses mostly on the culture of a ﬁrm and its sys-
tems and controls’ (FSA 2005, 31, 59). Since being established, the FCA has made
it clear that TCF still ‘remains central to our expectations of ﬁrms’ conduct’ (FCA
2013a), and the issue of culture remains central to its supervisory risk assessment of
ﬁrms. It has also been noted elsewhere (McConnell 2014), that the TCF Cultural
Framework provides a sound basis for establishing a broader risk culture
framework.
One speciﬁc example of the regulator taking up the issue of culture has been its
‘Thematic Review’ on risks to consumers from ﬁnancial incentives (FSA 2012a).
This review examined the practice of 22 authorised ﬁrms, identifying the importance
of culture in the context of product mis-selling. It also illustrated how good and poor
practice in staff incentivisation affects the probability of mis-selling, thus providing
guidance to the wider authorised community. In an appendix to the review, which
supports the discussion around culture and incentives, there is a list of examples of
regulatory enforcement cases with references in each case to the relevant ﬁnal notice
(FN). An FN is issued under s.390 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
when the regulator has taken enforcement action against individuals or ﬁrms because
their conduct has fallen below the standards expected by the regulator. It sets out
action taken against ﬁrms or individuals for breaches of regulatory requirements and
explains the nature of, and reasons for, the breach. The penalties and their publica-
tion in an FN are speciﬁcally intended to encourage change in the behaviour of the
offender and deter future non-compliance by others. A broader aim of this approach
is to help the regulator fulﬁl its statutory objectives (FCA 2013b, sec. 2).
This paper starts from the position that FNs have the potential to provide guid-
ance to ﬁrms concerning culture and behaviours, part of their objective as set out in
the regulator’s own Enforcement Guide (FCA 2013b). It is certainly the case that
FNs are examined by those involved in the ﬁnancial services sector for guidance as
2 P.J. Ring et al.
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to the regulator’s approach to speciﬁc issues (see, e.g. Brown and Rice 2012;
TaylorWessing 2012), although it is less clear the extent to which the FNs are
drafted with this in mind. Given the signiﬁcance of risk culture for regulated ﬁrms,
this paper examines the potential use of FNs as a means of communicating how the
regulator interprets the relevance of (risk) culture in an organisation; in particular,
the nature of behaviours and actions which might signal what a good or bad (risk)
culture looks like.
First of all, this paper reviews the literature relating to organisational and risk
culture, and in particular notes the principal dichotomy between an interpretivist and
objectivist approach to risk culture. In doing so, it identiﬁes some of the key ele-
ments or features of each approach. The literature review then goes on to examine
the development of the UK regulator’s approach to risk culture, noting in particular
the development of a cultural framework as early as 2007.
Thereafter, this paper employs a two-stage qualitative content analysis. In the
ﬁrst instance, it attempts to establish the extent to which the regulator speciﬁcally
draws attention to the term ‘culture’ in FNs. It identiﬁes, through analysis of FSA
Final Notices issued in 2012 (FSAFNs), references to the notion of culture, and
examines the nature of the cases where culture is speciﬁcally mentioned. In particu-
lar, it considers the extent to which elements identiﬁed as signiﬁcant in the develop-
ment of culture by the risk management industry are also acknowledged as
important by the regulator.
Acknowledging that issues relevant to risk culture might be addressed without
mentioning the word ‘culture’, in the second instance a similar technique is used to
identify the extent to which the key drivers of culture set out by the regulator in the
TCF Cultural Framework are mentioned in the FSAFNs. Having established this
framework in 2007, and subsequently recognising its importance in speeches and
published documents, one might expect that the key drivers and indicators of culture
identiﬁed by the regulator in 2007 would, by 2012, have percolated down into its
day-to-day enforcement work and be reﬂected in the discussion of behaviours and
outcomes discussed in the FSAFNs.
The paper uses the results of this analysis to critically assess the extent to which,
and the nature of, issues concerning risk culture, and speciﬁcally the cultural frame-
work elaborated by the regulator itself, are highlighted in the FSAFNs examined.
Thereafter, it considers how useful FNs are, or could be, in communicating the regu-
lator’s position concerning organisational (risk) culture, and behaviours which have
the potential to drive appropriate (risk) culture within ﬁnancial ﬁrms. This is impor-
tant given the power of risk culture to unconsciously drive action (IIF 2009) and the
work of the likes of Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier, and Stulz (2012) which suggests institu-
tions need to learn from their behaviour.
Culture and risk management
Culture is what a group learns over a period of time as that group solves its problems
of survival (Schein 1990, 111)
an organisational culture may be generally described as a set of norms, beliefs, princi-
ples and ways of behaving that together give each organisation a distinctive character
(Willcoxson and Millett 2000, 93)
Journal of Risk Research 3
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Organisational culture can be regarded as encapsulating the values and behaviours of
a ﬁrm, as demonstrated in its business decisions and actions (Willcoxson and Millett
2000; Brooks 2010; Group of Thirty 2012). The strength of that culture is determined
by the consistency of decisions and actions, made with consideration (consciously or
subconsciously) of the desired outcomes of the organisation, thereby aligning daily
behaviours with the principles and values of that organisation (Althonayan, Killackey,
and Keith 2012). As the Institute of Risk Management (IRM) has noted, ‘the culture
of a group arises from the repeated behaviour of its members’ (IRM 2012a, 22). To
that extent, culture encapsulates a description of the ‘nature’ of an organisation as a
whole, as well as a set of functions and practices within that organisation. Risk culture
might thus be considered to be ‘a term describing the values, beliefs, knowledge and
understanding about risk shared by a group of people with a common purpose’ (IRM
2012b, 7) where ‘attitudes and behaviours towards risk are both inputs to risk culture
and they are also both outcomes from it’ (IRM 2012a, 22).
Whilst some suggest any distinction between culture and risk culture is pointless
(Power, Ashby, and Palermo 2013), it is perhaps useful to consider risk culture as
inextricably entwined with, but not the same as, organisational culture. The increas-
ing emphasis on enterprise-wide risk management in risk literature signiﬁes the
importance, when discussing organisational culture, of the alignment and consis-
tency of risk decisions and behaviours with the broader principles, values and ways
of behaving within the organisation (Althonayan, Killackey, and Keith 2012). In
other words, risk culture, by its very nature, is inherently part of the fabric of organi-
sational culture, and its nature can be shaped by the organisational culture which a
ﬁrm strives to adopt.
A good risk culture?
An ‘interpretivist’ approach to culture focuses on the multiple interests and sensibili-
ties within an organisation (Waring and Glendon 1998) which give rise to the ‘nature’
of, or epithet applied to it when encapsulating, its culture. From this perspective,
culture is not framed by its rules, corporate mission or training modules; but rather by
the way it grows, learns and changes in the interaction amongst its operating groups,
sub-groups and ultimately individuals (Schein 1990). Culture is not delivered or
inherited, but learned. Hofstede refers to it as ‘the collective programming of the
mind that distinguishes the members of one organisation from others’ (Hofstede,
Hofstede, and Minkov 2010, 6), emphasising a ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of (more or
less) shared basic assumptions and learning (Schein 2004).
It is also important to note that, within a single organisation, there can exist a
plurality of (sub)-cultures, each with its own speciﬁc effects and implications for the
organisation as a whole (Willcoxson and Millett 2000). As McConnell (2014) points
out, it may be important for success that a diversity of opinions within different
areas of an organisation are not overwhelmed by a single, dominant, culture. Here, a
more nuanced understanding of the relationships and interactions within an organisa-
tion is required, where the interplay between risk-taking sub-cultures is important
for eventual outcomes (Power, Ashby, and Palermo 2013).
Operationalising culture
On the other hand, for ‘scientiﬁc rationalists’ (Bate 1994), culture is a more objec-
tive issue. Althonayan, Killackey and Keith (2012, 4) argue that culture ‘is not an
4 P.J. Ring et al.
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intangible concept but one which can be measured’, and there are various elements
which can be identiﬁed ‘that signify a strong risk culture within an organization’. As
Power, Ashby, and Palermo point out, ‘most of the practice literature on risk culture
tends to adopt an underlying conception of culture that is objectivist (culture is
anchored in systems, structures and other objective features)’ (2013, 17). In the UK,
the IRM has developed a ‘Risk Culture Aspects Model’ (IRM 2012b) which, whilst
not setting out an ‘ideal’ risk culture, nevertheless identiﬁes features, processes and
behaviours which the IRM believes an organisation should consider when assessing
the appropriateness of its risk culture. These are arranged into four groups: tone at
the top, governance, competency and decision-making.
‘Tone at the top’ refers to the nature of risk leadership and how an organisation
deals with bad news. The issue of leadership is common in this type of analysis (IIF
2009, 2013; PWC 2010; Davidson et al. 2012). Equally, Schein (1990) also notes
that norms and beliefs (for Schein a key feature of culture) can ‘arise around the
way members respond to critical incidents’ (1990, 115). Governance is seen
as encapsulating the transparency and timeliness of information ﬂows, as well as
accountabilities for managing risk. Again, these issues have been noted elsewhere as
being important in helping establishing an appropriate (risk) culture (Ashby,
Palermo, and Power 2012; IIF 2013). Competency encompasses risk resources and
risk skills; that is, the resources and skills that enable the embedding of a risk infra-
structure sufﬁcient to support the desired (risk) culture. Finally, decision-making is
linked to information ﬂows in the sense that it seeks to conﬁrm risk decisions are
informed decisions, and that employee incentives reward appropriate behaviours.
These issues are also underlined elsewhere (IIF 2013; McConnell 2014) as being
important elements in this type of framework.
Overall, if culture is a function of repeated behaviours, then it is understandable
that attempts to inﬂuence organisational culture will focus on speciﬁc behaviours, as
well as identiﬁable systems and processes that engender those behaviours; all of
which can be identiﬁed and measured and changed. Yet, what is also clear from this
discussion is that whilst culture may well arise from repeated behaviours, the pre-
vailing culture which develops can itself inﬂuence future behaviours in a mutually
reinforcing process (IRM 2012a). Therefore, even as organisations may, at a practi-
cal level, focus on culture from an objectivist perspective; the ‘interpretivist’
approach, focusing as it does on giving ‘name’ to the assumptions and values under-
lying systems, processes and behaviours, should not be overlooked; since it is only
in characterising these assumptions that one can consider their recursive inﬂuence
on behaviours.
Risk culture and the regulator
A review of regulatory speeches delivered by the FSA Chairman, Chief Executive
and other senior ofﬁcers in the period 2010–2012 indicates culture is an essential
dimension of enquiry for the regulator (see Table 1).
Whilst this review revealed a great deal of discussion about the nature of culture
required from ﬁrms:
… it is about the customer being able to trust you and know the advice process is
working for them. This is the culture I want to see running through your ﬁrm than
through the industry … (Wheatley 2012b)
Journal of Risk Research 5
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such comments are better understood as identifying what the regulator regards as
appropriate outcomes. As the FSA’s Director of Supervision noted: ‘Very important
here is the culture of the ﬁrm. We see this as a potential root cause of poor outcomes
….’ (Adamson 2012). The regulator’s approach does not appear to be about
determining the appropriate culture of a ﬁrm, but about looking at outcomes as an
indicator of, or helping to characterise, the culture of that ﬁrm. It is summed up in a
speech by the then Chief Executive of the FSA:
For regulators, the starting point should be that we want the ﬁrm to have a culture
which encourages individuals to make the appropriate judgements and deliver the out-
comes we are seeking … The regulator’s focus should therefore be on what an unac-
ceptable culture looks like and what outcomes that drives. It should not be on deﬁning
the culture itself.
…
What should matter to the regulator are the outcomes that the culture delivers and that
the ﬁrm can demonstrate it has a framework for assessing and maintaining it. (Sants
2010a)
The regulator may not wish to deﬁne ‘good’ culture, but it clearly wants to judge
and assess it (Sants 2010b), and to ‘incentivise a culture that delivers the right [regu-
latory] outcomes’ (Sants 2012a). What makes culture visible for the regulator and
Table 1. Review of regulator’s speeches 2010–2012.
Who Post When Title
Hector Sants Chief Executive, FSA 17.6.10 Do Regulators have a role to
play in judging culture and
ethics
Hector Sants Chief Executive, FSA 4.10.10 Can Culture be Regulated
Hector Sants Chief Executive, FSA 18.4.11 Solvency 2 in context
Hector Sants Chief Executive, FSA 2.3.11 Creating the FCA
Hector Sants Chief Executive, FSA 29.6.11 BBA Speech: The Future of
Banking Regulation in the UK
Hector Sants Chief Executive, FSA 19.5.11 PRA Banking Conference:
What is the Purpose?
Martin Wheatley CEO Designate, FCA 25.1.12 My vision for the FSA.
Clive Adamson Director of Supervision,
Conduct Business Unit,
FSA
25.1.12 FCA Conduct Supervision
Hector Sants Chief Executive, FSA 24.4.12 Delivering effective corporate
governance
Martin Wheatley CEO Designate, FCA 4.5.12 Rebuilding trust and conﬁdence
in bankers
Clive Adamson Director of Supervision,
Conduct Business Unit,
FSA
14.6.12 What does the FSA want to see
from industry
Martin Wheatley CEO Designate, FCA 2.7.12 The FCA: Our Vision for
enforcement
Adair Turner Chairman, FSA 3.7.12 FSA Annual Meeting
Martin Wheatley CEO Designate, FCA 5.9.12 Sales Incentivization
Adair Turner Chairman, FSA 11.10.12 Causes of Financial Crisis
6 P.J. Ring et al.
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enables the regulator to make judgements are the outcomes of ﬁrms’ behaviour; as
well as the individual behaviours, ﬁrm structures, and systems and processes which
‘drive’, or incentivise, those outcomes.
It follows that, to encourage the ‘right’ culture, one must have a view on what
practices or behaviours should be encouraged or avoided – for the regulator, those
which facilitate, or militate against, its regulatory outcomes. One might expect these
views to be communicated in FNs issued by the regulator, as these reﬂect the judge-
ments of the regulator in relation to outcomes arising from behaviours and practices
that should be avoided in so far as they result in outcomes the regulator does not
want to see. This is particularly pertinent given the ‘judgement-based’ approach to
regulation that has been emphasised in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis and the intro-
duction of a new structure of regulation in the UK (Treasury 2010; Sants 2011).
Ethics, principles, culture and TCF – the regulator’s existing track record
In spite of pronouncements that the regulator ‘does not do ethics’ (Sants 2010a,
2010b), it has in the past set out the kind of ethical model or framework, underpin-
ning its Principles for Business, which it argued could inform the values and culture
of ﬁrms (FSA 2002a). This approach envisaged regulatory dividends for ﬁrms with
the right culture and values, at least in part heralding the ‘principle-based’ approach
to regulation set out by the FSA in 2007 (FSA 2007b). Much criticised post-ﬁnan-
cial crisis, the principle-based approach has not disappeared; rather, the regulator has
shifted to an ‘outcomes-based’ approach to achieve its objectives (see Black 2010).
Importantly, the use of principles, and their ‘higher level articulation of what the
[regulator] expects ﬁrms to do’ (Black 2010, 13) remains. If culture can be said to
be ‘doing what we do in the ordinary course of business’, post-ﬁnancial crisis, the
regulator has focused on judging the outcomes of what ﬁrms do – and, by
implication, judging a ﬁrm’s culture.
Whilst the debate about ethics envisaged in the 2002 Discussion Paper (FSA
2002a) that did not materialise, one speciﬁc initiative which took forward the efforts
of the regulator to instil an ethical approach in ﬁrms was the ‘TCF’ initiative
(Edwards 2006). The initiative found its feet in 2001 with the publication of a Dis-
cussion Paper entitled ‘Treating customers fairly after the point of sale’ (FSA 2001).
This document pointed out the poor ‘complaints culture’ of ﬁnancial services ﬁrms,
too many of whom did not give adequate priority to complaints, nor did they use
them as a means of improving service. Publishing a progress report in 2002, the
FSA indicated its commitment to ‘embark on a programme of work’ (2002b, 10)
and thus the TCF initiative was born.
Signiﬁcantly, in the context of this paper, the FSA made it plain that:
Treating customers fairly (TCF) is a cultural issue. It is only through establishing the
right culture that senior management can convert their good intentions into actual fair
outcomes for consumers. (FSA 2007a, 2)
TCF is based on the regulator’s Sixth Principle for Business: ‘A ﬁrm must pay due
regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly’. In 2006, as further guid-
ance for ﬁrms, the regulator set out six speciﬁc outcomes it wanted its TCF initiative
to deliver (FSA 2006). The ﬁrst of these was that: ‘Consumers can be conﬁdent that
they are dealing with ﬁrms where the fair treatment of customers is central to the cor-
porate culture’ (FSA 2006, 3). There followed publication in 2007 of a ‘Cultural
Journal of Risk Research 7
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Framework Model’, based on the TCF cultural outcome, which established six key
drivers of TCF culture; drivers which are considered to have much wider applicability
(McConnell 2014). Each driver was accompanied by indicators and contra-indicators
(FSA 2007a, Annex 1). The document also contained brief scenarios covering good
and poor practice, which allowed ﬁrms to consider their own circumstances.
Taken together, all of these developments suggest a long-standing recognition
from the regulator that it is possible, and indeed necessary, to indicate clearly to
ﬁrms the types of behaviours, attitudes and practices it might expect to drive, or
indicate, good and poor culture – or at least the good and poor outcomes that may
be driven by that culture. The FSA made clear in 2007 that it would incorporate the
TCF framework in its ARROW risk assessment of ﬁrms, thematic reviews and
enforcement cases where necessary (FSA 2007a, 7–8).
Culture and Final Notices
It has been argued in relation to risk culture that, as yet, ‘there is no consensus on
exactly what it is or how it might be managed’ by ﬁrms (Ashby, Palermo, and
Power 2012, 4). That said, one of the leading risk management organisations in the
UK, the IRM, has established four groups of constituent aspects of risk culture
around which there is much agreement (IRM 2012b). At the same time, the UK reg-
ulator has provided a set of drivers, indicators and contra-indicators, along with
examples, in relation to ‘culture’. These provide, at least from an objectivist perspec-
tive, a benchmark which ﬁrms might use to assess the way they do things i.e. their
risk culture.
Therefore, if ﬁrms were to look for examples of regulatory judgements about
poor culture, as well as discussion of the relevance of systems, processes, controls
and behaviours to culture, they might be justiﬁed in expecting to ﬁnd these in the
FNs issued by the regulator. Public censure through the publication of FNs is a
means by which the regulator can communicate poor behaviour to the regulatory
community; and potentially, if not always successfully, seek better conduct from reg-
ulated individuals and ﬁrms (Turner 2005). Indicators of good or poor culture in a
ﬁrm are likely to be found in the behaviours of the ﬁrm discussed in the relevant
FN. Consequently, for others seeking guidance on what good or bad risk culture
might look like, FNs could be expected to be a useful source of help in this regard.
Further, this might also be expected given that the regulator’s whole approach to
enforcement should be designed to be in furtherance of its statutory objectives. In
these circumstances, it is to those FNs we now turn for further analysis.
Methodology
The current study is composed of a two stage inductive and deductive qualita-
tive content analysis (Mayring 2000) of FNs for the period 1 January 2012 to 31
December 2012 – the FSAFNs. The examination of FNs in research is not unique
(Turner 2005); however, this is a more methodical process of content analysis
(Weber 1983; Elo and Kyngäs 2008) than may have previously been carried out.
The work of Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Miihkinen (2012) provides justiﬁcation
for content analysis when looking at risk disclosures within the accountancy profes-
sion, albeit this current methodology intends to ascertain the importance of culture
in relation to regulatory behaviour.
8 P.J. Ring et al.
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FNs serve as notices for those who have been censured by the UK ﬁnancial ser-
vices regulator, but are also relevant for the behaviours of peers or other market par-
ticipants. Nevertheless, whilst the pursuit of ‘credible deterrence’ by regulators relies
on the public nature of such notices, there is no speciﬁc regulatory obligation to
signpost failings in a way that assists other parties in learning from regulatory
breaches. That said, given the sensitivity of businesses in relation to their failing,
and therefore the lack of information generally provided by market participants in
relation to such failings, FNs provide richness, transparency and robustness beyond
much that otherwise exists, and are generally regarded as a signiﬁcant source of
information by compliance specialists. Given the FSA’s focus on culture, its judge-
ment-based approach, and increased concentration on outcomes in relation to regu-
lated ﬁrms, it might therefore be expected that it would have used its
pronouncements in the FNs as a means of communicating about behaviours of ﬁrms,
and the relevance of culture in relation to those behaviours. This might particularly
have been expected by 2012, at which point its post-ﬁnancial crisis approach had
become embedded, and it was already clear in regulatory speeches that outcomes
and culture would be key issues for the new FCA regulator (see Table 1).
Sample
It was therefore decided to examine all FNs for the period 1 January 2012 to 31
December 2012 (the FSAFNs), which were obtained from the FSA website (www.
fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/notices/ﬁnal/2012). The initial sample of all
FSAFNs returned 160 notices totalling £311,569,256 in ﬁnes, reﬂecting the universe
of regulatory sanctions imposed by the FSA for this given year.
These notices were then ﬁltered using the following inclusion and exclusion cri-
teria: (1) must be issued to a ﬁrm and (2) must have at least two FSA approved per-
sons within the ﬁrm. The rationale for this screening process is the consensus in the
literature that culture as a concept relates to groups, even though it may be
informed and created by individuals. Therefore, where an FSAFN was addressed to
individuals alone it was excluded. However, the nature of UK ﬁnancial services is
that a large number of ﬁnancial advisory ﬁrms are made up of one ‘Approved
Person’ i.e. authorised by the regulator and appearing on its register, either trading
as a limited company or a sole trader. Therefore, ﬁrms with only one approved per-
son were also excluded from analysis. It was recognised that some excluded ﬁrms
may employ non-approved person staff who contribute to behaviours and practices
in a ﬁrm, but it was considered that a ﬁrm with two or more approved persons was
more likely to be of sufﬁcient overall size of staff to be relevant to issues of culture.
A total of 53 FSAFN met the inclusion/exclusion criteria.
The FSAFNs followed a consistent and standardised format both in tone,
framing and content thus allowing for relative ease in comparability and data
extraction. Importantly, an FSAFN does not suffer from the kind of bias found in
data sourced from the organisations under analysis (Linsley and Shrives 2006;
Miihkinen 2012), bias which may become more pronounced when communicating
negative information.
Analysis techniques
The 53 FSAFNs extracted from the original sample were all initially read in order to
facilitate immersion in the topic (Glenn, Champion, and Spence 2012), and were
Journal of Risk Research 9
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then analysed in a two stage methodology. The ﬁrst stage involved a summative
analysis of all FSAFN using word search criteria that involved the words ‘culture’
and ‘cultural’ (Hsieh and Shannon 2005) with the purpose of capturing all references
to the term ‘culture’. Whilst it is clear that there is a range of, sometimes contest-
able, elements that might be regarded as together constituting an organisation’s cul-
ture, their relevance and signiﬁcance for the development of a ﬁrm’s culture can
easily be overlooked. This, in turn, makes it even more important for issues to
be clearly signalled; especially, if FNs are to be useful for reﬂective learning by
industry practitioners about their organisation’s culture. The most obvious signalling
is reference to the term ‘culture’, hence the nature of the initial search.
This created a population for further study consisting of 9 FSAFN containing the
word ‘culture’, with none returning a match for ‘cultural’. Brief details of each
Notice are set out in Table 2. Upon initial examination, it was found that in each
case the issue of culture was relevant to the decision in the Notice (see Table 2).
There then followed an analysis of the context within which the issue of culture
had been considered by the regulator to be relevant in each of the nine FSAFNs
(Holsti 1969; Babbie 1992; Morse and Field 1995), examining for evidence of the
themes established in the literature review: namely, the objectivist/interpretivist
dichotomy; the relevance of sub-cultures; and the four elements identiﬁed as relevant
by the IRM when assessing risk culture. Whilst it might be assumed, given the nat-
ure of the TCF Cultural Framework (discussed in more detail below), that the regu-
lator would take a more objectivist approach in its discussion of culture, our
analysis allowed this to be tested. Further, it enabled the extent of commonality
between the elements of systems, processes and behaviours identiﬁed as key by a
leading risk industry body (the IRM) and those identiﬁed by the regulator to be con-
sidered.
The second stage of the analysis focused on the TCF Cultural Framework Model
previously discussed. It might be expected that whether or not there was direct use
of the word ‘culture’, in the FSAFNs, the regulator would nonetheless use the ele-
ments identiﬁed in its Cultural Framework to discuss the relevance and importance
of the issue of organisational culture. The analysis was deductive in nature, using
the drivers speciﬁed in the Cultural Framework Model for coding (Hsieh and
Shannon 2005) as it sought mention and discussion in the FSAFNs of the indicators
or contra-indicators of good culture established by the regulator itself.
Given that any FN identiﬁes a relevant breach of the regulator’s Principles for
Business, and Principle 6 is the ‘TCF’ Principle, it was considered that any FSAFN
assessing behaviour relating to the drivers for culture discussed in relation to Out-
come 1 of the TCF Outcomes would be most likely to involve a breach of Principle
6. In particular, if the regulator was using its own cultural framework as a means of
judging and assessing culture, then evidence of this should be most apparent in
those FSAFNs that involved a breach of Principle 6. A search yielded six instances
of a Principle 6 breach within the sub-sample of 53 FSAFN. We then searched for
the six drivers of ‘Leadership’, ‘Strategy’, ‘Decision making’, ‘Controls’, ‘Recruit-
ment, training and competence’ and ‘Reward’ identiﬁed in the Cultural Framework
Model, amongst the six FSAFNs stated to involve a breach of Principle 6.
The two stage analysis techniques were performed by two researchers autono-
mously so as to improve research validity (Patton 2002) with consultation on each
of the stages prior to ﬁnalisation of the data-set. The following section will now
discuss the ﬁndings of this two stage analysis.
10 P.J. Ring et al.
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Findings and analysis
Stage 1 – the nature of risk culture
Whilst much of the discussion in the nine FSAFNs identiﬁed in Table 2 considers
behaviours, the FSAFNs also make it apparent that it is not sufﬁcient for ﬁrms to
rely upon an objectivist approach in addressing risk culture within an organisation.
In some of the sample of FSAFNs, the nature of behaviours and effectiveness of
systems and controls appear to be, at least in part, a function of the broader, more
interpretivist, notion of culture. When the FSA noted in Case 4 that ‘there was a
culture within Martin Currie to seek and support the fund managers in what they
wanted to do’ (FSA 2012c, 7); or that in Case 7 ‘The historic culture of the
Collections Department had been to focus on the quick recovery of arrears’ (FSA
2012d, 10); it may be simpler to say that behaviours, systems and controls, are
inevitably shaped by and, in some senses, reﬂect, a prevailing culture. This is under-
lined in Case 1, where the FSA noted ‘there continued to be signiﬁcant unresolved
issues with the effectiveness of the control framework, which were exacerbated by
issues in relation to culture and management information’ (FSA 2012e, 22). This in
turn requires ﬁrms to consider the nature of that culture, since the speciﬁc values or
norms embodying that culture will have speciﬁc effects. Thus, in Case 1 it was
also noted that ‘the culture of optimism impeded the effective management of trans-
actions’ (FSA 2012e, 4).
Recent work by Power, Ashby, and Palermo (2013) speciﬁcally draws attention
to this continuum between what they refer to as objectivist and subjectivist
approaches, and to the fact that the risk management industry has adopted a more
objectivist approach. They emphasise the narrowness of the objectivist approach and
the manner in which it may underestimate the complexity of organisations (2013,
17–18) It is submitted that an examination of the regulator’s views in the FSAFNs
identiﬁed could provide ﬁrms with a similar lesson.
Sub-cultures
Whilst not speciﬁcally identiﬁed as such, the regulator also highlights the sig-
niﬁcance of sub-cultures in the FSAFNs. In Case 8, 40 staff, including 11
managers, engaged in blatant LIBOR rate ﬁxing, yet this was not reported,
even by seven other managers found to be aware of the practice. This ‘reck-
less’ behaviour was traced back to ‘a poor culture in its [UBS] interest rate
derivatives trading business’ (FSA 2012b, 36). Again, Case 4 indicates ‘there
was a culture within Martin Currie to seek to support the fund managers in
what they wanted to do’ (FSA 2012c, 7), in this case ultimately resulting in
misclassiﬁcation of investments, breach of investment limits on unlisted invest-
ments, breach of conﬂict of interest policies and an eventual payment of
£5.1M in compensation.
Case 6 refers to an internal UBS report indicating ‘there were weaknesses related
to the culture of challenge required in the logistic and control function’ (FSA 2012g,
10) – weaknesses which subsequently contributed to losses of £2.3Bn in rogue trad-
ing. Whilst the act of challenging is itself a behaviour, what actually appears to be
in question is the norms and values which inﬂuence that behaviour – indicating a
more interpretivist view of culture. What we see here is the regulator drawing
attention to the need for ﬁrms not just to focus on behaviours, but on the character
12 P.J. Ring et al.
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of the norms and beliefs underpinning those behaviours; and not just at a ﬁrm level,
but in identiﬁable groupings which have their own speciﬁc norms and beliefs
i.e. sub-cultures.
There was also a second theme concerning the dominant inﬂuence of strong-
minded directors and managers (Cases 2, 3 and 9) on the way things were done
in (parts of) organisations. For example, in Case 9 the Chief Executive, also car-
rying out a broker role, was found to be responsible for ‘the unacceptable pres-
sure sales culture’ (FSA 2012f, 3) at the ﬁrm, which led to a number of rule
breaches. The consequences of such behaviours included lack of reporting,
breaches of procedures and withholding of material from the FSA. This inﬂuence
of one strong individual on a risk environment might be regarded as ‘cultural
capture’. It highlights the manner in which an individual, or group of individuals,
can use their inﬂuence and power to enforce behaviour upon others. This can cre-
ate a culture that represents the attitudes and integrity those individuals, as
opposed to the employees over whom they exert that power. It may also result in
a sub-culture that is capable of undermining, or subverting, the development of
an appropriate risk culture across an organisation as a whole.
What is clear from the above that there may be a number of cultures in a ﬁrm,
and their interaction, as well as the exercise of power in developing behaviours and
practices, can have signiﬁcant consequences. It is also clear that the discussion in
the FSAFNs indicates the need to adopt a pluralist, as opposed to unitarist, concep-
tion of risk culture within an organisation (Willcoxson and Millett 2000; Ashby,
Palermo, and Power 2012; McConnell 2014). Finally, it is also important for ﬁrms
to appreciate the complex interaction between behaviours and the ﬁrm’s culture.
They need to go beyond an objectivist approach and examine the norms and values
underlying speciﬁc behaviours, as well as the implications of that examination for
their business.
Having established this last point, the examination of the FSAFNs, as well as
regulatory statements, nevertheless highlights that a main focus when making
judgements about culture concerns behaviours. The work of the IRM in this
regard identiﬁed four key groups of behaviours, and therefore our next step was
to consider the extent to which the FSAFNs mentioning culture could be said to
highlight what risk managers would consider to be the key behaviours inﬂuencing
culture (IRM 2012b).
‘Tone at the top’
An examination of the FSAFNs indicates the importance of leadership; the ‘tone’ set
by higher levels of an organisation. The most direct examples, in Cases 2, 3 and 9,
draw attention to the importance of the behaviours of founders or key directors of
an organisation, and the effect this can have on culture within an organisation. In
these three cases, strategic decisions taken by senior managers resulted in insufﬁ-
cient regard being paid to the appropriate regulatory and accounting requirements
for running the businesses, and in Case 9 unacceptable sales practices. In Case 7,
there was a ‘focus on the quick recovery of arrears’ (FSA 2012d, 10), as a result of
a bonus system established by senior managers; and in that Case this strategic ‘tone
from the top’ incentivised bad practices resulting in the organisation breaching the
FSA’s requirements and being ﬁned £1,225,000.
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Governance
This aspect of the IRM’s model refers to the timeliness and transparency of informa-
tion ﬂows in managing risk, as well as accountabilities for that management. These
issues are well illustrated in the sample of FSAFNs, underlining the relevance of
lack of governance in relation to the poor culture.
Case 3 highlights the failure of a Finance Director to ensure compliance with
accounting standards, as well as attributing this failure to the Chief Executive of the
organisation – the FD’s line manager. Case 4 draws attention to a failure to manage
conﬂict of interest which ultimately resulted in a lack of transparency of information
provided to clients. Delay in identifying the conﬂict of interest was considered to be
partly due to ‘the absence of a formal control framework’ (FSA 2012c, 11). Case 8
also illustrates clearly how lack of governance through inadequate systems and con-
trols led to unfettered manipulation of published data.
As regards timeliness, Case 5 highlights the fact that, despite reporting to the FSA
that implementation was imminent, the organisation had failed to complete, or dis-
close ‘fundamental difﬁculties’ in, the implementation of an IT system considered as
essential to providing adequate information to oversee the business. The regulator
concluded that the organisation failed ‘to take reasonable care to organise and control
its affairs responsibly and effectively, with adequate risk management systems’ (FSA
2012h, 15). Cases 1, 4, 6 and 8 also draw attention to shortcomings of governance,
all highlight a failure to establish adequate (risk management) systems and controls.
Competency
The FSAFNs are illustrative of a number of issues related to risk resources and
skills. Case 1 highlights the problems that can arise when there are inadequate
resources or systems available to assess risk appetite or distribution. The general
issue of inadequate resources leading to risk management problems is also illustrated
in Cases 2, 6, 7 and 8.
Case 5 draws attention to the manner in which inadequate attention to the board
structure of an organisation can result in a lack of skill and experience resulting in
inadequate governance. It also draws attention to how inadequate resources and staff
changes can create gaps in the ‘three lines’ of risk defences.
Finally, Cases 5 and 8 also highlight the need for appropriate skills. In the for-
mer case, a lack of skills prevented appropriate management information systems
being implemented in a timely manner. In the latter case, problems arose as a result
of the organisation’s approach to the ﬁrst line of defence in risk management, which
assumed skills those involved did not have (FSA 2012b, 29–30).
Decision-making
This aspect of the IRM’s framework considers the extent to which decisions are
informed, and requires that incentives reward appropriate behaviours. Cases 1 and 6
draw attention to the problems created by mis-aligned incentives. As previously
noted in relation to Case 7, an inappropriate bonus system created incentives leading
to the inappropriate handling of arrears.
As regards inadequately informed decisions, the examples discussed in the
‘competency’ section above clearly highlight the way in which inadequate risk
14 P.J. Ring et al.
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management resources can lead to poorly informed decisions. This position is
supported by Bryce, Cheevers, and Webb (2011) when discussing the role of risk
management accountability and educational awareness of staff in those areas of the
business whose primary objective may not necessarily be the management of risks
(or so they thought).
As in other work of the regulator, these FSAFNs draw attention to the link
between incentives, behaviours and the culture within an organisation.
What does unacceptable culture look like?
This ﬁrst stage of analysis illustrates clearly the potential richness of the FNs in pro-
viding evidence of, in the words of Hector Sants, ‘what an unacceptable culture
looks like’ (Sants 2010a) – and the outcomes that transpire as a result. They
address both the relevance of culture from an interpretivist perspective and the key
objectivist behavioural elements which have been identiﬁed by the risk management
industry as the most signiﬁcant in the development of risk culture.
Nevertheless, it became clear at the data-gathering stage that the format of these
documents does not lend itself readily to deriving lessons concerning the issue of
culture. It might have been hoped, given the avowed importance of this issue for the
regulator, that ﬁrms would have been able to discern more simply and straightfor-
wardly the cultural lessons from the behaviour giving rise to the FSAFNs. Yet, in
ﬁve of the nine relevant FSAFNs, the word ‘culture’ is mentioned only once; and no
obviously consistent approach is adopted in signposting the issue of culture,
let alone explicitly linking the speciﬁcs of the cases to the issue of culture. This is
despite the fact that, as shown in this part of our analysis, the themes and issues
raised in these FSAFNs illustrate the key elements raised in our literature review.
Case 9 is instructive in this regard. It draws attention to a ‘pressure sales culture’ in
the ﬁrm ‘being at odds with relevant July 2007 FSA guidance in its document enti-
tled “Treating customers fairly – culture”’ (FSA 2007a) (hereafter ‘the TCF culture
document’) which sets out the TCF Cultural Framework. Yet, although the material
in Case 9 highlights a number of the key drivers and indicators of good and bad cul-
ture identiﬁed in the TCF culture document, it does not speciﬁcally identify them as
such. Ironically, the ﬁrm involved was not found to have breached Principle 6 – the
TCF Principle.
Nevertheless, if it is possible for the regulator to address cultural issues in its
FNs, even if not schematically, and if this is indeed an important issue for the
regulator, then one might expect to ﬁnd this approach taken more consistently in
relation to breaches of the FSA’s Principle for Business 6 – TCF – upon which the
TCF initiative is based. In particular, it might be expected that there would be
discussion of the cultural drivers and indicators discussed in the TCF culture
document.
The second stage of the analysis therefore examines the extent to which the
FSAFNs involve a breach of the TCF principle (Principle 6), and analyses the con-
tent of these cases in the context of the TCF cultural framework.
Stage 2 – deductive analysis of Principle 6 (TCF) breaches
Amongst the 53 FSAFNs identiﬁed as the relevant population in this study, only six
involved a breach of Principle 6. All six were analysed using the framework of
Journal of Risk Research 15
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cultural drivers set out in the TCF Cultural Framework and explained in the various
chapters of the TCF cultural document. This analysis produced the results set out in
Table 3.
Once any of the drivers were identiﬁed in the six Notices, a detailed analysis
was then undertaken of the context within which discussion of that driver took
place.
It should be noted that when using the word ‘Reward’ as a search term none of
the relevant Notices produced a result. Given that part of the genesis of this research
was an FSA paper on ‘Incentives’ (FSA 2012a), and that this document appeared to
use the term ‘rewards’ as a synonym for incentives (FSA 2012a, 13, 14, 18, 19, 28,
29), the search term ‘Incentive’ was also used (see Table 3).
It should also be noted that amongst the breaches of Principle 6 only one notice,
Case 7, refers to ‘culture’, and only Case 13 refers to the TCF initiative itself – and
in both instances only once. Interestingly, as Table 3 highlights, these two cases
mention the broadest range of TCF cultural drivers, and therefore, one might have
expected greater mention of culture and of the TCF Cultural Framework (the latter
is not mentioned at all.) In fact, throughout all of this research, the only mention of
the TCF Cultural Framework found is in Case 9, which, as already indicated, was
not found to involve a breach of Principle 6 – the TCF Principle.
Cultural drivers
Controls
This is the most commonly cited driver (see Table 3). That said, in two FSAFNs
(Cases 10 and 11) the word ‘control’ or ‘controls’ was used as a reference to text
contained in the FSA handbook, highlighting the type of breaches or the regulator’s
available powers. This does not assist in understanding the nature or context of the
behaviour involved in any breach of controls; nonetheless, their presence within the
notice does indicate the materiality of controls.
As regards, the other three cases in which controls were mentioned, reference to
failure to have adequate controls concerned both the ineffectiveness of adequate con-
trols: ‘not ensuring that these were followed in every instance’ (FSA 2012d, 19);
being ‘aware that signiﬁcant issues had been raised … but failed to take sufﬁcient
action to deal with them’ (FSA 2012i, 2); as well as inadequate, or a lack of, con-
trols (Case 12). The lack of engagement of both compliance and senior management
was also identiﬁed as control issues (Cases 7, 12 and 13). The analysis drew atten-
tion to problems concerning either the identiﬁcation, collection or use of appropriate
management information – for example, the failure to ‘obtain and review sufﬁcient
Management Information to enable it to identify and deal with areas of concern’
(FSA 2012d, 19). All of these issues are elements identiﬁed both in the TCF cultural
document’s discussion of ‘controls’, as well as in the literature on risk culture more
generally.
Decision-making
These notices clearly evidence elements of the drivers for good and bad decision-
making. Case 7 draws attention to a lack of clarity in the decision-making process
and the recording of decisions; whilst Case 13 draws attention to the capability of
16 P.J. Ring et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
ott
ing
ha
m]
, [
Ro
b W
eb
b]
 at
 00
:19
 11
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
4 
T
ab
le
3.
F
N
s
an
al
ys
ed
fo
r
T
C
F
‘d
ri
ve
rs
’.
F
S
A
tr
ea
tin
g
cu
st
om
er
s
fa
ir
ly
cu
ltu
ra
l
dr
iv
er
s
C
as
e
N
o.
N
am
e
C
ul
tu
re
cu
ltu
ra
l
L
ea
de
rs
hi
p
S
tr
at
eg
y
D
ec
is
io
n
m
ak
in
g
C
on
tr
ol
s
R
ec
ru
itm
en
t
tr
ai
ni
ng
co
m
pe
te
nc
e
R
ew
ar
d
re
m
un
er
a-
tio
n
in
ce
nt
iv
e
10
S
he
ttl
es
to
n
an
d
T
ol
lc
ro
ss
C
re
di
t
U
ni
on
L
im
ite
d
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
11
P
ri
nc
ip
al
M
or
tg
ag
e
S
er
vi
ce
s
L
im
ite
d
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
12
S
un
L
if
e
A
ss
ur
an
ce
C
om
pa
ny
of
C
an
ad
a
(U
K
)
L
im
ite
d
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
N
o
13
C
ar
d
P
ro
te
ct
io
n
P
la
n
L
im
ite
d
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
14
A
rg
en
tu
m
-L
ex
W
ea
lth
M
an
ag
em
en
t
L
im
ite
d
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
7
C
he
sh
ir
e
M
or
tg
ag
e
C
or
po
ra
tio
n
L
im
ite
d
Y
es
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Journal of Risk Research 17
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
ott
ing
ha
m]
, [
Ro
b W
eb
b]
 at
 00
:19
 11
 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
4 
those making decisions as well as lack of sufﬁcient challenge of decisions where
these appeared not to have followed guidelines. The lack of review of decisions
(a contra-indicator of good TCF culture) is also emphasised in Case 12.
Recruitment/training/competence
Cases 7 and 13 identify the problems arising as a result of not having the correctly
trained people undertaking tasks. The potential for conﬂict of interest between deliv-
ery of training and compliance monitoring (by the same unit) is also an interesting
element raised in Case 7, as well as the case highlighting the importance of
resources in the delivery of effective training and competence.
Reward/remuneration/incentive
Case 13 identiﬁed incentives which ‘created a risk of sales agents using inappropri-
ate objection handling techniques to discourage customers who tried to cancel their
policies’ and resulted in them being ‘overly persistent in persuading potential cus-
tomers to purchase … even after the customers had had made it clear that they did
not wish to buy’ (FSA 2012i, 14, 19). In Case 7, the culture of the department col-
lecting debt arrears was inﬂuenced by key performance indicators and formal bonus
systems based on speed of collection of arrears which risked customers not being
treated fairly.
Leadership
The only case in which the term ‘leadership’ appeared is Case 13, where there was
concern that the ‘Leadership Team’ of the ﬁrm ignored the recommendations of
compliance reports – consistent with indicators of poor leadership. In addition, a
lack of leadership in governance arrangements was noted; in particular, the fact that
a ‘leadership team’ appeared to take decisions outside of the ﬁrm’s governance
structures and which were not recorded. These appear to be contra-indicators of ade-
quate decision-making and controls in terms of TCF culture.
Strategy
The term ‘strategy’ only appeared in Case 12, and its use referred to the investment
strategy of the ﬁrm. The main concern in this case was the lack of review or
approval of decisions about the investment strategy within the ﬁrm, and ultimately
the effect this could have on policyholders. Whilst this latter point is a contra-indica-
tor of good culture in so far as it relates to strategy, it is clear that the discussion of
strategy in this case also speciﬁcally related to both decision-making and controls –
see mention of Case 12 in the above discussion of decision-making. This highlights
the importance of the contextual analysis undertaken.
Culture, the FSAFNs and TCF drivers
Where there has been a stated breach of Principle 6 for Businesses, our analysis
shows that the discussion of the circumstances of these breaches in the FSAFNs
draws attention to the drivers of TCF culture identiﬁed in the TCF culture document
18 P.J. Ring et al.
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(although none of the six FNs involving a breach of the TCF principle referred to
the TCF Cultural Framework stemming from that principle). Whilst the drivers men-
tioned in the TCF culture document are discussed in the notices, and do provide
potential lessons for practitioners should they examine the notices carefully enough,
a clear opportunity is being missed. As previously noted, the regulator’s own
Enforcement Guide makes it clear that one rationale for the enforcement process,
including the publication of FNs, is to inﬂuence behaviour. That being the case, one
might expect a regulator that wishes to inﬂuence the culture in ﬁrms, and to draw
speciﬁc attention to the manner in speciﬁc behaviours can inﬂuence that culture (see
also IRM 2012a, 2012b in this regard), would take the opportunity to explicitly link
the behaviour discussed in these FSAFNs with its TCF Cultural Framework.
Whilst organisational risk culture and TCF culture should not be regarded as
referring to the same thing, the IRM and TCF frameworks are similar in that they
are both intended for use as a diagnostic tool. Equally, the importance of issues such
as ‘tone at the top’ (leadership), controls, incentives, capability and transparency, all
identiﬁed as key issues for the development of appropriate risk culture by the IRM
(2012b), are also emphasised in the TCF framework. What is clear is that FNs, in
conjunction with the regulator’s own diagnostic tool (the TCF Cultural Framework),
have the potential to guide practitioners to develop a suitable culture in their
business which incorporates not only the regulator’s TCF initiative, but also an
appropriate organisational risk culture.
Conclusion
Our approach today is to draw conclusions about culture from what we observe about
a ﬁrm – in other words, joining the dots rather than assessing culture directly.
(Adamson 2013, 2)
The Director of Supervision of the FCA, the UK’s new conduct regulator, is clearly
concerned with the organisational risk culture in ﬁrms and its importance in ensuring
the FCA achieves its statutory objectives. It is also clear, as has already been dis-
cussed, that the regulator’s focus is more concerned with behaviours and outcomes
than identifying a ‘right’ culture. Our analysis of the FSAFNs also indicates that the
behaviours identiﬁed and highlighted by the regulator are very much aligned with
the behaviours identiﬁed by the risk management industry as the key issues for
establishing an appropriate risk culture.
That said, regulator’s judgements on regulatory behaviour, as disclosed in
the FSAFNs, also indicate the relevance and importance of a broader, more interpre-
tivist, approach to understanding culture. In highlighting this, the FSAFNs also draw
attention to the limitations of the more objectivist approach embodied in a risk
framework, and of the need to understand the complexity of organisations in their
day-to-day activity.
What is also clear from our analysis is that despite having created the TCF
Cultural Framework as a diagnostic tool in 2007, with its broad applicability to
behaviours affecting culture in ﬁrms, it does not appear to be mentioned explicitly as
a tool or guide in connection with appropriate behaviours, outcomes or culture.
Nevertheless, what our analysis also shows is that the indicators and contra-indicators
established by the Framework are discussed in the FSAFNs, but perhaps not as
frequently as one might expect.
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In all, having created a diagnostic tool concerned with key behaviours related to
(risk) culture in ﬁrms, and with it placing increasing emphasis on ﬁrm risk culture,
our research suggests that the regulator may have overlooked the potential of its
work in FNs as a means of driving forward its agenda. If the ‘dots’ referred to can
be thought of as ﬁrm behaviours, then it is submitted that FNs can be used to draw
linkages between those behaviours and the norms and values which underpin them;
together encapsulating the ‘culture’ of an organisation. In turn, this should enable
the regulator to illustrate the outcomes (and, where appropriate, the poor culture)
that are intimately connected with those behaviours. This is particularly likely given
that the methodological approach in this paper has been focused on those FNs where
such guidance would be expected to be most obvious. It may well be that the other
FNs beyond the FSAFNs could also provide further guidance. Nevertheless, it is
submitted that whilst the material in the FNs has the clear potential to signiﬁcantly
assist the regulator in achieving this objective, as they currently stand they are fall-
ing short in several ways.
Firstly, undertaking this work has illustrated the potential difﬁculty for busy
practitioners in divining, from the regulator’s comments in the FNs about the spe-
ciﬁc behaviour in individual ﬁrms, insight into lessons for the development of their
own ﬁrm’s risk culture. This research suggests there could be more speciﬁc signpo-
sting of matters relevant to the issue of culture in FNs as it is clear that the lessons
and themes that are currently emphasised by the risk management industry are also
there to be taken on board and understood in the FNs. What is also clear, however,
is that this is made much more difﬁcult for practitioners and others following the
decisions of the regulator than it need be.
Secondly, having developed indicators of good and poor culture by at least 2007
in the TCF Cultural Framework, it is disappointing that subsequent discussions of
culture in regulatory speeches appear to have largely ignored the potential contribu-
tion of this structured approach. What is clear from the examination of the FSAFNs
involving a breach of the TCF principle is that, unsurprisingly, the drivers of TCF
culture are relevant in the discussion of behaviour and outcomes in the FSAFNs;
and that their incorporation in such a discussion could be a useful learning tool for
ﬁrms. Indeed, other recent research has suggested this framework could also form a
basis for assessing and reforming the risk culture of the banking system (McConnell
2014). It is therefore disappointing, and also surprising, that the regulator has not
made much more use of this framework; both in assessing the poor outcomes it dis-
cusses in FNs, as well as in its work on risk culture more generally.
Thirdly, and following on from this last point, measures need to be taken by the
regulator to more clearly integrate the drivers and indicators set out in the TCF Cul-
tural Framework, whenever these are relevant, and signal their use in its FNs. FNs
are, ﬁrst and foremost, formal documents prepared by the Enforcement Division of
the regulator in the context of taking action against a ﬁrm. In that sense, there has
never been an explicit requirement for these documents to be formally framed as
educative documents. Nevertheless, the regulator’s guide to enforcement indicates
that in deciding to publish its decisions it should consider ‘whether the publication
sets out the FSA’s expectations regarding behaviour in a particular area, and if so,
whether that message still has educational value’ (FCA 2013b, section 6.10.A).
What is also clear from this research is that FNs do not lend themselves to ready
examination, particularly in relation to identifying themes and speciﬁc issues. Reme-
dying this might involve a change in format that recognises FNs are digested by
20 P.J. Ring et al.
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ﬁrms, industry commentators and other interested parties, who could all beneﬁt from
an easily accessible document which is drafted in a way that clearly recognises its
educative potential. One step further would be the creation of a database (as opposed
to a list of pdf-formatted notices) with interrogative search functions that might pro-
mote more active learning by ﬁrms and their advisers.
Failing all of this, it may be incumbent on the regulator to undertake more
analysis itself. It has already used examples of FNs in relation to discussing the cul-
ture of incentives (FSA 2012a), and it is not that great a step to provide an annual
analysis of FNs in terms of the issues they raise about risk culture in an organisation
(at least in the context of the outcomes the regulator wishes to achieve), based on
the drivers of those outcomes.
If, as the Salz Review suggested:
The goal should be to change the tangible things about what the service does for
customers and how people will do their work; gradually, this will change the culture.
(Salz 2013, 177)
then the regulator’s FNs provide a signiﬁcant and regular opportunity to drive home
this message and help ﬁrms achieve this goal, That is why the FNs are important,
and that is why the ﬁnancial regulators in the UK need to give greater thought to
their use of FNs as a learning tool.
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